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Different types of adverse selection ￿type of insurance product, type of unit, type of 
coverage and number of actual yields reported in Federal crop insurance is examined 
utilizing binomial and ordered logit discrete choice models for all U.S. cotton producers, 
1997-2000.  The associated costs of adverse selection in U.S. cotton range from $32 






 AN EXAMINATION OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF ADVERSE 
SELECTION IN FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE 
 
Asymmetric information has been the theme of economic analysis for more than 
half a century in the area of agriculture, finance, industrial organization, labor economics, 
development economics, income taxation, and resource allocation (see Stiglitz; Grossman 
and Stiglitz; Myers and Majluf; Spence; Basu; and Stiglitz and Dasgupta).  Recognition 
of the importance of asymmetric information in economic theory is evident from the 
receipt of Nobel prizes in economic sciences by James Mirrlees and William Vickery in 
1996 for their fundamental contributions to the theory of incentives under asymmetric 
information, and George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz in 2001 for their 
contribution to the theory of markets with asymmetric information. 
Akerlof and Spence have demonstrated the presence of adverse selection due to 
informational asymmetries with contradictory outcomes ￿ only lemons remain in the 
market compared to hiring of low productivity workers with low wages due to signaling.  
Extending the above concept, Rothschild and Stiglitz show that their model has no 
pooling equilibrium (only separating equilibrium) since the insurance companies by 
offering different types of insurance can be profitable.  Research on the incentives and 
market implications of asymmetric information to U.S. crop insurance markets has seen 
an increase in recent times.  Asymmetric information due to adverse selection in crop 
insurance has been addressed using experimental or survey data, small samples of farm 
record data or yield data provided by Risk Management Agency (RMA).  Recently  2 
Atwood et al utilizing RMA￿s cotton yield and loss history from 1996-2000 have 
examined the presence of asymmetric information due to adverse selection as signaled by 
their choice of and level of insurance coverage.  In this paper, we extend to examine the 
presence of different types of adverse selection in Federal crop insurance based on the 
choice of crop insurance policies employing all U.S. cotton producers who purchased 
federal crop insurance in the years 1997-2000. 
Crop insurance has gained importance as USDA￿s primary policy instrument in 
protecting farmers against risk with the Freedom to Farm Act of 1996 and the 
Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000.  Federal Crop Insurance Company through the 
Risk Management Agency offers several yield and revenue crop insurance policies 
relying on private companies for product delivery, service, and loss adjustment.  Since 
the establishment of the Federal crop insurance program in 1938, the program has 
consistently experienced lower than desired participation and higher than desired loss 
ratios (indemnities divided by premiums).  Various policy modifications like increased 
subsidization to all levels of coverage, expansion and development of crop insurance 
products for additional crops, regions and higher coverage levels have been made in an 
attempt to make the program a more effective risk management tool for producers (and 
thus increase participation) while simultaneously attempting to reduce excessive losses. 
To a larger extent higher than desired loss ratio and loss cost ratio has been 
acknowledged and economists have examined numerous aspects of crop insurance 
including moral hazard (Chambers; Just and Calvin; Smith and Goodwin; Coble et al), 
adverse selection (Skees and Reed; Quiggin et al; Just and Calvin; Atwood, Shaik, and  3 
Watts;), demand for crop insurance (Coble et al), and rating methodologies (Goodwin; 
Atwood et al; Skees, Black and Barnett; Goodwin and Ker; Olivier Mahul;). 
Still current crop insurance policies are faced with different types of adverse 
selection within the RMA￿s insured pool of producers and the leading cause for low 
participation, and high loss ratio and loss cost ratio.  Adverse selection is defined as 
asymmetric information in which a producer has more knowledge about his or her risk of 
loss than does the insurance provider in crop insurance.  Under RMA￿s current 
procedures, producers have the choice to insure yield or revenue insurance product; basic 
or optional unit; number of actual yields reported, apart from the choice of and level of 
insurance coverage based on his/her perceived risk in order to maximize profits each crop 
year. 
In general the various choice of crop insurance policies available to the producers 
are: (1) type of insurance product
1 selected by the producer - standard multiple peril crop 
insurance (MPCI), a policy that insure producers against losses due to natural causes such 
as drought, excessive moisture, hail, wind, frost, insects, and disease, or the revenue
2 
based crop revenue coverage (CRC) that provides revenue protection based on price and 
yield expectations by paying for losses below the guarantee at the higher of an early-
season price or the harvest price; (2) type of unit insured ￿ basic unit (BU) consist of all 
acreage of the crop in a county held by the insured under identical ownership or optional 
unit (OU), producers who farms satisfy certain spatial requirements are allowed to 
divided their farm into different insurable units and to report yields separately on each 
unit over time.  The optional units provision is popular with producers due to its low  4 
relative cost and the ability to indemnify losses on separate sections of land; (3) type and 
level of coverage - catastrophic coverage, a plan of insurance that provides coverage 
equal to 50 percent (50%) of the approved yield indemnified at 55 percent (55%) of the 
RMA’s insurable market price or if the producers so choose, they can pay a higher 
premium for buyup coverage, i.e., 50-85 percent of the approved yield indemnified at 55-
100 percent of the RMA’s insurable market price; and finally (4) the number of actual 
yields reported by the producer compared to assigning a T-yield or other kinds of yields 
without yield history is an avenue of asymmetric information due to adverse selection. 
Ideally a simultaneous decision making of the type of insurance product, type of 
unit, type of insurance coverage and number of actual yields reported is warranted in 
choosing a crop insurance policy.  Empirically this can be addressed by objective nested 
decision-making process but is subjected to the bias of which crop insurance policy 
(insurance product, unit type, coverage or number of actual yields reported on each unit 
or farm) forms the prior and posterior nest.  Hence we examine the presence of different 
types of adverse selection independently for insurance product, unit type, coverage or 
number of actual yields reported but conditional on other types of adverse selection 
variables. 
A traditional model of asymmetric information is presented in the next section of 
the paper that examines the presence of different types of adverse selection in Federal 
crop insurance by the producer￿s risk as revealed by their choice of insurance product 
(MPCI vs CRC), unit type (BU vs OU), number of actual yields ( ) <> = 44 versus , and 
coverage levels (0.325% to 75% election) defined as a binary and ordered multiple  5 
random variable respectively.  Expected loss cost ratio (normalize indemnities over 
normalized liabilities) is used as proxy for risk, other variables include average farm 
yields, RMA￿s county-level base insurance premium rate used as a proxy for differences 
in county level risk, practice (irrigated versus dryland) dummy, state dummies and year 
dummies.  Third section discusses the empirical binomial and ordered logit models to 
examine the presence of adverse selection along with the description of the data.  The 
regression results and cost of adverse selection are presented in the next section followed 
by a conclusion section. 
 
THEORETICAL MODEL OF ADVERSE SELECTION 
Consider a stylized risk averse producer facing a potential loss of future output. 
Assume that the producer is initially endowed with a level of wealth W.  At the end of the 
next time period the producer will realize one of the two possible states
3 of the world - 
State 1 with probability of loss  p and State 2 with probability of no loss ( ) 1− p .  We 
assume that the producer￿s preferences over risky choices can be modeled using expected 
utility.  The objective function can than be modeled as: 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 U puW L puW =- + -  
Assume that producer purchase insurance for a premium Z payable in state 1, the 
utility objective function is: 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) 21 U puW L I Z p uW Z =- + - + - -   6 
where W  is the initial wealth,  L  is the loss, I  is the indemnity and Z  is the premium of 
insurance.  Further the indemnity paid depends on the type of crop insurance policy opted 
by the individual producer as signaled by his or her choice of type of insurance product, 
type of unit, type of coverage, and number of actual yields reported within a farm policy.  
Under the assumption of no transaction cost, the premium is a function of type crop 
insurance policy, risk () α associated with type of insurance policy and other observable 
characters () β . 
  Equation (2) can be re-written as: 
(3) ( ( , ) ( , , ))
(1 ) ( ( , , ))
U p u W L I policy Z policy
p u W Z policy
αα β
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which has first order conditions (FOC): 
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  Sufficient second order conditions for a maximum are that producers be risk 
averse i.e.,  ′′< u 0 over the relevant domain.  Drawing upon the implicit function 
theorem if the first order conditions are satisfied, equation (5) can be rewritten with the 
crop insurance policy i.e., choice of the type of insurance product, type of unit, type of 
coverage, and number of actual yields reported expressed as:  7 
(6) ( , ) Policy f αβ =  
where () α  is the risk factor influencing the choice of crop insurance policy and () β  
represents other observable characters. 
Equation (6) can be employed to examine the presence of different types of 
adverse selection expressing individual producer￿s choice of crop insurance policy as a 
function of risk () α  -expected loss cost ratio is used as a proxy for farm level risk and 
other factors () β -- average farm yields (farm productivity), RMA￿s county-level base 
insurance premium rate used as a proxy for differences in county level risk, practice 
(irrigated versus dryland) dummy, state dummies, year dummies and conditional adverse 
selection variables.  The empirical model examines if RMA￿s insuree pool is 
conditionally adversely selected for different types of crop insurance policy.  These 
results have important implications with respect to the RMA￿s ability to achieve the 
often-conflicting policy objectives of higher insurance participation, charging actuarially 
fair premiums, and avoiding excessive loss ratios.  Results presented below provide 
strong evidence that the insured pool is indeed strongly adversely selected. 
 
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA 
To examine for the presence of different types of adverse selection, ordered logit 
and binomial logit discrete choice models are estimated with the producer choice of crop 
insurance policy --type of insurance product, type of unit, coverage level, and number of 
actual yields as the dependent variable.  The producer choice of the insurance product is  8 
coded as 0,1 for the binomial logit model where 0 corresponds to revenue based crop 
insurance product, CRC and 1 corresponds to yield based crop insurance product, MPCI.  
Similarly producer choice of unit type (basic and optional unit) and number of actual 
yields reported by the producer( ) =< > 44 versus , defined as binary choice variable is 
coded as 0, 1 for the binomial logit model.  The producer￿s choice of coverage (0.325 to 
0.75) is modeled as the dependent variable and is coded as 0,1,..., 6 for the ordered logit 
model where 0 corresponds to the choice of a minimal catastrophic policy, 1 corresponds 
to 50 percent buyup coverage, etc. 
In the following regressions, the individual producer choice of crop insurance 
policy is modeled as a function of  (1) expected loss cost ratio () x1  is defined as the ratio 
of annual 50% normalized indemnities divided by annual 50% normalized liabilities at 
the farm level and used as proxy for farm level risk, (2) fybar () x2  defined as the average 
yield accounting for individual farm productivity, (3) ctyrate () x3 defined as RMA￿s 
county-level base insurance premium rate used as a proxy for differences in county level 
risk, (4) practice dummy (Dp r a c _ )- irrigated versus dryland,  (5) state dummy variables 
(Ds t a t e s _ ) and (6) year dummy for the years 1997 through 2000 ( D year _ ).  Other 
conditional variables included are the insurance product, unit type, buyup coverage 
election, and number of actual yields reported to account for other types of adverse 
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  Information on each insuree who purchased cotton insurance for the years 1997-
2000 was extracted from RMA￿s yield history and loss history data files
4.  The expected 
loss cost ratio used as a proxy for farm level risk is computed as the ratio of indemnities 
received over liabilities.  Since the loss cost ratio is expected to increase with increase in 
coverage, OU compared to BU, CRC compared to MPCI, and less than four actual yields 
compared to more than four actual yields, we computed the expected indemnities and 
liability for all the producers as if they have insured at 50% coverage level.  This would 
address the inherent correlation between higher coverage and higher loss cost ratio and 
the use of normalized loss cost ratio would truly reflect the farm level risk. Average yield 
computed as the arithmetic mean farm level yield over the last ten years is used to 
account for the individual farm productivity.  RMA￿s county-level base insurance 
premium rate used as a proxy for differences in county level risk is computed as the mean 
of all individual farm level premium rates for 50% coverage within each county. 
The number of insured cotton farms, the total acres insured, average farm yield, 
county rate and the expected loss cost ratio for different crop insurance policies are 
presented in Table 1.  It is evident from Table 1 that the more number of insured 
producers (farms) elected MPCI, basic unit, buyup 65% election, and more than four 
actual yields compared to CRC, optional unit, other buyup percent election, and less than 
four actual yields respectively.  Average farm yields reported a similar pattern with 
higher average farm yields reported by MPCI (629.95 lbs compared to 617.84lbs for 
CRC), basic unit (965.63 lbs compared to 580.84 lbs for optional unit), buyup 75% 
election (779.39 lbs compared to 464.75 lbs for 50% election), and more than four actual  10 
yields reported (650.13 lbs compare to 601.73 lbs for less than four actual yields).  
However higher normalized loss cost ratio was shown by CRC, optional unit, other 
buyup percent election, and less than four actual yields (0.214, 0.177, 0.228 and 0.155) 
compared to MPCI, basic unit, buyup 75% election, and more than four actual yields 
(0.115, 0.070, 0.154 and 0.121). 
 
REGRESSION RESULTS OF ADVERSE SELECTION 
Tables 2 present the results of the binomial and ordered logit regression models as 
estimated using qualitative and limited dependent variable model of SAS
5.  The results of 
all four discrete choice regression models support the presence of adverse selection as 
multiple peril crop insurance (MPCI) relative to crop revenue coverage (CRC), more than 
four reported actual yield relative to less than reported actual yields (optional unit (OU) 
relative to basic unit (BU), higher buyup coverage levels relative to lower buyup 
coverage level and catastrophic coverage) are negative (positive) and significantly 
correlated with higher risk defined as normalized loss cost ratio.  This supports the notion 
of the presence of adverse selection in RMA￿s pool of cotton producers in U.S. for the 
years 1997-2000.  Average farm yield, a measure of individual farm productivity was 
negative (positive) and significantly correlated with insurance product and unit type 
(coverage level and reported actual yields).  This demonstrates that high average yielding 
(irrigated) producers choose CRC, basic unit, lower (higher) coverage level, and report 
more than four actual yields.  11 
As expected, the signs on conditional variables -insurance product, unit type, 
coverage level, and number of actual yields reported included were appropriate and 
correct.  For example the sign on the unit type in the insurance product regression is 
negative and significant indicating the producer with optional units choose CRC 
insurance product.  The same result is demonstrated in the unit type regression model 
with the sign on the insurance product variable is negative and significant indicating 
producer with MPCI choose basic unit.  Similar and consistent results are demonstrated 
by other conditional variables. 
Analogous to the r-square in linear regression models, McFadden suggested a 
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where L is the value of the maximum likelihood function at the maximum and  0 L  is a 
likelihood function when regression coefficients except an intercept term are zero.  The 
McFadden￿s likelihood ratio index is bound between 0 and 1.   
Other goodness-of-fit measures developed by Veall and Zimmermann 
2
VZ R , and 
Mckelvey and Zavoina 
2
MZ R  reported in Table 2 are  
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  12 
where  0 lnL  is computed with null slope parameter values, N  is the number of 
observations,  ￿ ￿ii yx β ′ =  and 
1 ￿￿ /
N
i i yy N
= =∑ . 
THE COSTS OF ADVERSE SELECTION IN U.S. COTTON INDUSTY 
The results of the regression models support the hypothesis that RMA’s insured 
pool is adversely selected with lower risk producers electing lower crop insurance policy 
(multiple peril crop insurance, basic unit, lower coverage level, and reporting more than 
four actual yields) and higher risk producers selecting higher crop insurance policy (crop 
revenue coverage, optional unit, higher coverage level, and reporting less than four actual 
yields).  In this section we attempt to estimate the costs due to different types of adverse 
selection over the time period 1997-2000.  
To examine the different types of adverse selection costs in US cotton, cotton 
indemnification information from RMA’s loss history data-base was aggregated by the 
type of insurance (CRC and MPCI), type of unit (BU and OU), type and level of 
coverage (catastrophic, 50% to 75%) and less than four and more four number of actual 
yields reported. Table 3 presents summary statistics aggregated over the four-year period.  
Table 3 lists the number of farms, acreage insured, net acres (acres that received 
indemnity payments), the actual indemnities and the average 50% normalized loss cost 
ratio of all producers by the type of insurance, type of unit, type and level of coverage 
and number of actual yields reported during the period 1997-2000. 
The 50% normalized loss cost ratio values in the fifth column were computed as the 
ratio of total indemnities normalized to 50% over total liabilities normalized to 50%  13 
across all producers in the given category.  To estimate the adverse selection cost, we 
first compute the actual indemnities (column 4).  The values in column 5 are computed as 
the difference in the LCR’s of the crop revenue coverage and multiple peril crop 
insurance, optional unit and basic unit, 75% buyup and 50% buyup coverage, and more 
than four actual yields and less than four actual yields multiplied by the amount of actual 
indemnities of the crop revenue coverage, optional unit, 75% buyup coverage, and less 
than four actual yields respectively.  For example the LCR of the CRC was (0.214) while 
the LCR of the MPCI was (0.115).  The actual indemnity of all the producers who choose 
CRC was $71,172,553.  The estimated cost of adverse selection due to type of coverage 
is thus (0.214-0.115) x $71,172,553 = $32,930,635.  Similarly the cost of adverse 
selection due to type of unit, type and level of coverage and the number of actual yields 
reported is $359,154,161, $39,326,038 and $73,274,705 respectively in U.S. cotton 
industry for the period, 1997-2000. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The results presented in this paper support the hypothesis that RMA’s current 
insuree pool is adversely selected and that producers signal information with respect to 
their risk by their choice of crop insurance policy.  These results have several 
implications with respect to congressional policy objectives of higher participation, low 
cost, and equity across producers.  One implication is that the effectiveness of using 
partial subsidies in an attempt to increase participation will be limited and potentially  14 
quite costly if the current practice of charging a common premium price to all producers 
with similar first and/or second moment of yields is retained.  The current practice 
essentially ignores differences in producer risks.  A more effective, efficient, and 
equitable insurance program requires that a given producer’s premium rate must 
somehow include an adjustment for the level of the producer’s risk as signaled by his 
choice of crop insurance policy and also the risk aversion (which is seldom available).  
An obvious approach to account for differences in producer risk would be to incorporate 
information about the producer’s past indemnification, choice of crop insurance policy 
into current rates or incorporate the simultaneously effect of choice of crop insurance 
policy ￿ type of insurance product, type of and level of coverage, type of unit and number 
of actual yields reported, and normalized loss cost ratio in the estimation of the rates. 
Specifically from the estimation perspective, the choice of type of insurance 
product and type of and level of coverage needs to be simultaneously estimated.  So does 
the choice of type of unit and number of actual yields reported by the producer.  Both 
reflect the examination of asymmetric information in crop insurance.  15 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of the all US Cotton Producers, 1997-2000
Crop Insurance Policy No:of Insured Net MEAN
or Contract Farms Acres Acres Farm Yield Ctyrate LCRatio50
CRC 6,921 1,375,881 633,733 617.84 0.132 0.214
MPCI 217,595 35,498,095 13,197,859 629.95 0.147 0.115
Basic 169,339 24,378,690 6,834,453 695.63 0.117 0.070
Optional 64,189 12,499,311 6,568,200 580.84 0.170 0.177
Catastrophic 81,486 17,219,890 1,814,635 780.65 0.086 0.020
Buyup 50% 41,347 7,738,824 3,871,627 464.75 0.220 0.154
Buyup 55% 6,780 1,416,921 814,345 417.29 0.258 0.193
Buyup 60% 2,465 489,920 243,871 503.12 0.194 0.153
Buyup 65% 114,865 17,953,073 10,696,575 508.47 0.185 0.187
Buyup 70% 6,885 1,511,365 729,677 598.81 0.129 0.176
Buyup 75% 2,674 791,692 498,439 779.39 0.093 0.228
<4   Actual yields 69,330 10,554,207 3,579,261 601.73 0.130 0.155
>=4   Actual yields 201,740 39,185,073 15,970,335 650.13 0.138 0.121 18 
 
 
Table 2. Binomial and Ordered Logit Results Examining Types of Adverse Selection, US Cotton States, 1997-2000
Parameters Insurance Product Unit Type Coverage Level Actual Yields
(CRC vs MPCI) (BU vs OU) (0.325 to  0.75) (<4  vs  >=4)
coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio
Intercept 4.856 41.82 -0.990 -9.58 4.919 51.36 -0.045 -0.39
LCRatio50 -0.351 -7.34 0.195 10.68 0.518 32.93 -0.080 -3.85
Fybar -0.00029 -3.75 -0.00076 -22.78 -0.00032 -11.60 0.002 56.66
Ctyrate 6.349 24.42 1.576 23.48 -1.912 -34.53 1.299 15.79
D_prac (Irrigated=1) -0.084 -2.21 -1.045 -66.70 0.030 2.26 0.203 12.60
Insurance Product -0.159 -5.02 -1.465 -48.70 0.125 3.51
Unit type -0.054 -4.94 0.374 100.29 -0.069 -13.96
Coverage level -0.505 -45.54 0.348 95.47 0.082 21.38
Actuals 0.099 2.76 -0.186 -12.53 0.283 22.63
    Alabama 0.896 12.22 0.486 16.50 0.932 33.57 -0.827 -25.86
    Arizona 1.869 7.32 -0.049 -0.62 -1.763 -27.67 -2.127 -33.29
    Arkansas 0.689 5.33 -2.701 -22.96 -4.434 -80.91 -1.050 -33.74
    California 1.553 7.85 -1.464 -15.98 -3.010 -56.66 -1.451 -29.00
    Florida -0.953 -7.24 1.581 21.52 -0.976 -15.14 -1.674 -23.70
    Georgia -0.425 -8.90 1.364 59.03 -0.939 -47.28 -2.048 -89.62
    Louisiana 0.618 5.57 -1.111 -16.95 -2.869 -80.93 -1.043 -30.74
    Missouri 0.472 4.83 -0.346 -6.52 -2.663 -77.28 -0.777 -20.84
    Mississippi 0.326 2.20 -2.493 -15.91 -4.297 -61.26 -1.375 -37.03
    North Carolina -0.517 -3.30 -0.501 -5.77 -1.339 -20.84 -1.156 -15.87
    New Mexico 0.454 5.57 0.795 22.57 -1.370 -47.41 -1.612 -51.05
    Oklahoma 0.214 2.43 -0.361 -8.92 0.790 22.11 -0.060 -1.26
    South Carolina 1.233 4.96 0.830 14.13 -2.060 -42.31 -1.718 -34.82
    Tennessee -0.365 -3.26 -0.708 -8.15 -2.747 -58.78 -0.760 -16.14
    Virginia 0.854 3.48 0.367 3.73 -1.761 -25.60 -1.847 -26.34
D_98 0.808 12.82 0.060 3.30 -0.405 -27.77 0.075 4.18
D_99 -0.522 -11.88 0.120 7.06 0.304 22.00 0.236 13.63







McFadden’s LRI 0.138 0.160 0.178 0.079
Veall-Zimmermann 0.167 0.291 0.436 0.150
McKelvey-Zavoina 0.626 0.679 0.734 0.326
where,  MPCI= multiple peril crop insurance, CRC=crop revenue coverage, BU=basic unit, OU=optional unit 19 
 
 
Table 3.  Conditional Cost due to Types of Adverse Selection in US Cotton Industry, 1997-2000
Crop Insurance Policy No:of Insured Net Actual Loss Cost Cost of
or Contract Farms Acres Acres Indemnities Ratio 50% Adverse Selection
CRC 6,921 1,375,881 633,733 71,172,553 0.214
MPCI 217,595 35,498,095 13,197,859 899,264,588 0.115 32,930,635
Basic 169,339 24,378,690 6,834,453 323,664,282 0.070
Optional 64,189 12,499,311 6,568,200 595,609,620 0.177 359,154,161
Catastrophic 81,486 17,219,890 1,814,635 41,321,961 0.020
Buyup 50% 41,347 7,738,824 3,871,627 188,317,627 0.154
Buyup 55% 6,780 1,416,921 814,345 45,849,267 0.193
Buyup 60% 2,465 489,920 243,871 16,386,685 0.153
Buyup 65% 114,865 17,953,073 10,696,575 816,134,968 0.187
Buyup 70% 6,885 1,511,365 729,677 90,880,677 0.176
Buyup 75% 2,674 791,692 498,439 82,146,560 0.228 39,326,038
<4   Actual yields 69,330 10,554,207 3,579,261 336,134,198 0.155
>=4   Actual yields 201,740 39,185,073 15,970,335 1,039,059,960 0.121 73,274,705 20 
FOOTNOTES 
                                                            
1 Definitions of the types of insurance products are based on RMA web page. 
 
2 In the current data set, MPCI and CRC insurance product accounts for 99% of the crop insurance.  Other 
revenue crop insurance products include Group revenue insurance policy (GRIP) --makes indemnity 
payments only when the average county revenue for the insured crop falls below the revenue chosen by the 
farmer.  While the adjusted gross revenue (AGR) --insures the revenue of the entire farm rather than an 
individual crop by guaranteeing a percentage of average gross farm revenue, including a small amount of 
livestock revenue.  The plan uses information from a producer’s Schedule F tax forms to calculate the 
policy revenue guarantee.  Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) --provides revenue protection based on price 
and yield expectations by paying for losses below the guarantee at the higher of an early-season price or the 
harvest price.  Income Protection (IP) --protects producers against reductions in gross income when either a 
crop’s price or yield declines from early-season expectations.  Revenue Assurance (RA) --provides dollar-
denominated coverage by the producer selecting a dollar amount of target revenue from a range defined by 
65-75 percent of expected revenue. 
 
3While this example is a highly simplified two-state model, these results can be generalized to a continuous 
distribution using methods similar to those presented in Borch. 
 
4 RMA’s database consists of a number of different databases containing information with respect to 
insurance companies, agents, adjusters, and producers.  RMA’s yield history data set contains producers’ 
reported historical yields used in establishing an average or "approved" yield at the beginning of the 
insurance year.  RMA’s loss history data set records indemnities paid at the end of the insurance year. 
 
5 Based on as smaller sample size, comparison of parameter estimates of the discrete choice models 
estimated from LIMDEP, SHAZAM and SAS results in similar values. 
 